US Response to Soviet Invasions: Hungary and Czechoslovakia: A Critique of Liberation Policy
Ahmed, Abu Nasar Saied
List Price : US$ 44.78 Our Price : US$ 35.82
You Save 20% + FREE DELIVERY WORLDWIDE
Book ID : 3195
ISBN-10 : 81-8370-095-0 / 8183700950
ISBN-13 : 978-81-8370-095-5 / 9788183700955
of Publication :
of Publication :
Edition : (First Edition)
Language : English
xii, 236p., Bib., Index, 23 cm.
CONTENTS:- US Policy Towards Eastern Europe; 1. The Campaign for Liberation; 2. Post-Election Liberation Programme; 3. East Berlin Uprising the First text; America's Hungarian Dilemma; 4. Revolt in Poland; 5. The Hungarian Revolution; 6. US Role in the united nations; 7. Anger in the US Congress: Where Things Went Wrong; 8. Self-criticism or Introspection; 9. The Postscript: Execution of nagy; Czwchoslovakia 1968 Acceptance of Sphere of Influence; 10. Peaceful Engagement; 11. The Berlin wall and the US response; 12. Peaceful Engagement Experimented; 13. The Bridge-building Thesis; 14. Prague's experiments of reform; 15. The American Response; 16. US moves to the united nations; 17. Resentment and Condemnation in the US Congress; 18. The Brezhnev Doctrine; 19. Conclusion.
Fifty year agon, in October 1956, the mighty Soviet union invaded Hungary to crush a massive anti-Soviet rebellion that rocked Budapest. Twelve years later, Moscow repeated the same coercive and surgical measure in another country in Eastern Europe, Czecholovakia, a member of Warsaw treaty organization living in the Soviet sphere of influence. This book is a full-scale assessment, based on original documents and secondary source materials, of the US response to the two invasions to determine the efficacy of its policy of liberation of Eastern Europe. A great power, despite its pronounced policy of waging a psychological warfare against its powerful adversary, proved to be too weak to respond to the need of the hour to stall the Soviet invasions and to translate its policy of liberation into a reality when the opportune moment had appeared. It seeks to establish that tall but vague and false election promises during the 1952 Presidential election acted as an inducement to unarmed populace of Hungary to revolt against a mighty power that crushed the rebellion while the United States remained a silent sector from a safe distance. It also analyzes America’s response to the Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 when both the superpowers had, by implications, accepted their spheres of influences as a fait accompli.