The papers collected in this volume focus on the phenomenon of cognition from the epistemological point of view in the light of the linguistic and the cognitivist shift in philosophy in general and in philosophy of science in particular.
The recognition that psychology and cognitive science are central to the epistemological enterprise has led to a shift in the locus of evaluation from knowledge claims to belief formation in individual knowers. Psychological processes thus become primary objects of epistemic evaluations. The questions then are: (1) How are these processes to be evaluated?; (2) Given the limitations of a cognitive agent, how reliable are the methods employed by the cognitive architecture of the agent?; (3) How can the notion of reason and rationality be reconfigured so as to be tied to the new epistemology?; (4) Does the cognitivist approach help us to transcend the normativist-naturalist dichotomy?; (5) What light does the new approach shed on the rules of scientific and day-to-day reasoning?; (6) What is the significance of the new developments in epistemology in relation to the nature and limits of modelling as the basis of science as a cognitive enterprise. In dealing with these and similar other questions, the papers shed light upon the core concepts of epistemology (Western and Indian) such as concepts of meaning, reference, truth, justification, rationality etc.