Since Pakistan's birth in 1947 while Islam's role in state-building and identity creation has not been fully delineated and defined, the Military and civilian regimes however have impressively exploited its mass appeal to garner public support and political legitimacy. As a result Islamists have seen a steady rise as a third political force, culminating in Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal's rise to power in North West Frontier Province in 2002. It was unprecedented but not unexpected, as this book argues. The democratic opposition had accused Gen. Pervez Musharraf of establishing this partnership during his presidential referendum in 2002 in which the Military establishment had mobilised several extremist groups to campaign and organise meetings across Pakistan. Such a partnership has thrived time and again accruing political dividends to both sides and at times even at the expense of country's own security and political stability. The book traces the relationship between the Military and Islamists, herein referred to as the two extremes and examines various measures and acts that resulted since it evolved in 2002. It explains the dynamics of Military-Islamists partnership under Musharraf and how it differed in substance and intent from what featured under Gen. Zia ul Haq. This book is not only about their mutual trust but mistrust as well and illustrates the perils of such an engagement for Pakistan's own stability and security that Musharraf overlooked in his blind pursuit for power. It is a study that helps understand many events and developments that have rocked Pakistan recently.